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THE  1960s and 1970s were decades of enormous growth in the demand 
for single-family housing in the United States. The homeownership rate 
increased between 1960 and 1979 from 62 to 65 percent, and the quality 
of the average new home sold rose by over 25 percent.1 The increase in 
the homeownership rate is surprising because the numbers of young and 
single-person households,  which historically have  relatively low home- 
ownership rates, grew much more rapidly than older, multiperson house- 
holds, which have tended to have high homeownership rates.2 The increase 
in quality is surprising also because rising mortgage rates and relatively 
rapid increases in house prices doubled the real initial monthly mortgage 
payment on  a house of constant quality. Thus it has been increasingly 
difficult for households to finance houses with constant quality, much less 
houses with higher quality.3 
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1. Between 1963:1 and 1979:2, the average sales price of new houses actually 
sold rose by 275 percent, while the average sales price of a constant-quality  house 
increased  by 199 percent. 
2.  Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Mortgage Credit Availability and 
Residential  Construction,"  BPEA, 2:1979, pp. 333-76. 
3. James R.  Kearl, "Inflation, Mortgages and Housing," Journal of  Political 
Economy, vol. 87 (October 1979), pp. 1115-38. 
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The boom in single-family housing appears to have come to a screeching 
halt in late 1979 and early 1980. In just three quarters, from 1979:3  to 
1980:2,  the number of one-to-four family housing starts, at annual rates, 
fell by over 600,000  units; the average real price of a new house when 
sold declined by over 5 percent. These  are the steepest declines  in the 
postwar period, and they have come despite the introduction of money- 
market certificates at thrift institutions, the integration of the mortgage 
market with capital markets (particularly through the development of sec- 
ondary mortgage-market  instruments), and the federal government's over- 
riding of state usury ceilings, all of which s'hould  have reduced the cyclical 
sensitivity of housing. 
The prolonged boom  in single-family housing and the recent severe 
slump have a common explanation in the behavior of the real user cost of 
capital for owner-occupied housing. The gradual, but continual, decline 
in the real after-tax mortgage rate from about 3 percent in 1963 to -2 
percent in 1978 stimulated both increased homeownership and the pur- 
chase of larger houses.4 Conversely, the unprecedented speed and mag- 
nitude of the rise in mortgage rates in late  1979  and 1980  pushed real 
after-tax mortgage rates back into the positive range and triggered the 
recent housing slump. For once it can truly be said that the housing re- 
cession was caused by monetary policy, rather than by a booming econ- 
omy that disrupted a fragile housing finance system. 
This paper begins with a discussion of how some major determinants of 
housing activity affect the decision of whether to own or rent and the qual- 
ity of housing demanded by a homeowner. I then investigate how these 
determinants have changed during the past two decades. Next, equations 
are estimated to explain the level of homeownership, the number of one- 
to-four family housing starts, and the real value (a measure of quality) of 
these starts. Finally, some simulation experiments are conducted to fore- 
cast the real value of housing starts in  1979  and 1980  and to illustrate 
both the impact of rising inflation (in conjunction with the favored tax 
treatment of owner-occupied housing)  on the real stock of single-family 
4.  Patric H.  Hendershott and Sheng Cheng Hu, "Inflation and Extraordinary 
Returns  on Owner-Occupied  Housing: Some Implications  for Capital Allocation and 
Productivity Growth," Journal of  Macroeconomics (forthcoming); and Kevin E. 
Villani, "The Tax Subsidy to Housing in an Inflationary  Environment: Implications 
for After-Tax Housing Costs," in C. F. Sirmans, ed., Research in Real Estate (JAI 
Press, forthcoming in 1981). The real after-tax  mortgage rate is (1 -  r)i  -  p, where 
the tax rate, r, is set at 30 percent;  i is the mortgage rate; and p is the expected infla- 
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housing and the effect of various financial variables on single-family hous- 
ing cycles since 1960. 
Determinants of the Real Value of Single-Family Housing Starts 
The real value of single-family housing starts (the dollar value of starts 
divided by the residential construction deflator) is the product of the num- 
ber of  starts and the real value of the average quality per start (which 
depends on the number of square feet and amenities such as fireplaces). 
The  number of  starts reflects the  response  of  builders to  demand by 
households and economic conditions, with household demand reflected in 
changes in homeownership. The real value of single-family housing starts, 
then, depends on four decisions. Household formation, the tenure choice 
(the decision of whether to own or rent),  and the response of builders to 
that choice all affect the number of starts. The fourth decision is the per- 
unit demand for real housing. 
Of these decisions, household formation is taken as predetermined. The 
other three decisions are usually thought to be related to a combination of 
three sets of variables: demographic characteristics, real income and rela- 
tive prices, and credit-market conditions. The theoretical impact of each 
of these sets on the three decisions is considered in turn. No  attempt is 
made to distinguish between long-run and short-run determinants in this 
introductory discussion. 
DEMOGRAPHIC  VARIABLES 
As  Dwight Jaffee and Kenneth Rosen  have emphasized, households 
with different demographic characteristics have sharply different home- 
ownership rates.5 For example, in 1970  only one-quarter of households 
with a head under age twenty-five owned a home, while over one-half with 
a head between ages twenty-five and thirty-four arid  three-quarters  of those 
with even  older heads did.  Also,  households  made  up  of  single indi- 
viduals, especially younger ones, had far lower ownership rates than fam- 
ilies with heads in the same age group.6 Thus the homeownership rate for 
5. Jaffee and Rosen, "Mortgage  Credit Availability,"  pp. 342-43. 
6.  Results from a recent microeconomic  study suggest that homeownership  rates 
also vary significantly  by sex and race. See Harvey S. Rosen, "Housing Decisions 
and the U.S. Income Tax: An Econometric  Analysis,"  Journal  of  Puiblic Ecotionoics, 
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the entire economy will vary with changes in the demographic character- 
istics of the population, as well as with changes in economic variables. It 
therefore would appear to be useful to isolate the impact of demographic 
variables before attempting to identify the effects of economic variables 
on housing.7  Following Jaffee and Rosen, I accomplish this by expressing 
the ratio of homeowners, HO, to total households, HH,  as the product 
of two ratios: 
HO  HO  HOA 
HH  HOA  HH 
where HOA is a demographic adjusted level of homeowners. By construc- 
tion, HOA/HH  varies with changes in the proportions of households in 
different demographic classes, but not with changes in the ownership rates 
of households in each of these classes. In contrast, the adjusted home- 
ownership rate, HO/HOA,  depends heavily on changes in homeownership 
rates within demographic classes and only slightly on shifts in households 
between classes.8 Thus the adjusted ownership rate is the variable that 
will be related empirically to economic determinants of the tenure choice. 
This ratio rose almost monotonically from 0.946  in 1960:3  to  1.084 in 
1978:4; the adjusted and actual homeownership rates were equal in 1970. 
Demographic variables could  also affect the quantity of housing de- 
manded per homeowner unit. In his microeconomic study, Harvey Rosen 
found that demand is independent of household size but is an increasing 
function of the age of the household head.9 I suspect that this variable has 
captured the declining impact of  financial constraints on families with 
older household heads who have already experienced equity gains on pre- 
7. This is somewhat misleading because demographic variables may simply be 
proxies for economic variables. To illustrate, the main reason homeownership  rates 
are lower for young families is their greater mobility. Because of their expectations 
of shorter holding periods, transactions costs play a greater role in the economic 
decision and thus their user cost of capital is higher. 
8. More specifically, 
8 
HOAt =  HHt E  o,hit, 
T=1 
where hit is the proportion of total households of class i in period t, and c1 is the 
homeownership  rate for class i in a given base period. Thus HOA/HH  is indepen- 
dent of changes in the oi over time. However, there still remains a slight dependence 
of the adjusted  homeownership  rate on demographic  characteristics: 
HO  20otthit 
HOA -oih,  t 
9.  Rosen, "Housing Decisions." He also finds demand to be greater for house- 
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viously owned houses, and I account for this relation below. No demo- 
graphic variables appear in the demand equations. 
INCOME  AND  PRICES 
There  are  two  relative price  variables.  The  tenure choice  decision 
should depend on  the rental price of  housing services generated by an 
owner-occupied dwelling compared with the price of those services in the 
rental market. The real value of housing demanded by a typical owner 
should depend on the rental price of housing services relative to the price 
of nonhousing goods.  The latter price is reasonably defined as the con- 
sumer price index net of the shelter component. 
Specification of  the rental price series is a difficult task. For owner- 
occupied housing, the rental price under quite simplifying assumptions is 
the product of a real after-tax interest rate (plus some other, largely time- 
invariant, costs)  and the price of a constant-quality house.10  Measurement 
of  the  expected  inflation and financing rates for  the expected  holding 
period is required, and the rental price obviously varies among households 
depending on their tax brackets. I refer to this measure of rental price 
as user cost.  Figure  1 shows time series data for real user costs  (user 
costs  deflated by  the price of  nonhousing goods)  for the period from 
1956:1  to  1979:4  for owner-occupied households in the 15 percent and 
30  percent tax brackets (the  lowest two series)."  Both real user costs 
for owner-occupied housing rise in the second half of the 1950s, reach a 
plateau in the early  1960s,  and then show a downward trend through 
early 1979 because of a decline in the real after-tax mortgage rate.'2 
10. The homeownership component of the consumer price index, which is re- 
lated to a nominal before-tax interest rate, has been negatively correlated with this 
rental price over the 1965-80 period. See Ann J. Dougherty and Robert Van Order, 
"Inflation  and Housing Cost," working paper (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Office  of Economic Affairs, May 1980). 
11. The precise construction of the series is described in Hendershott and Hu, 
"Inflation  and Extraordinary  Returns";  and Patric H. Hendershott and James D. 
Shilling, "The Economics of Tenure Choice, 1955-79," in C. F. Sirmans, ed., Re- 
search itt Real Estate (JAI Press, forthcoming in 1981). 
12. The user costs are lower in 1964 for those in higher tax brackets  because of 
greater tax savings on their property taxes and interest payments; the decline since 
then is greater because their tax saving on interest payments is larger. The real user 
cost for those in the 45 percent tax bracket was, in fact, roughly zero in late 1978 
and early 1979, which implies that optimal behavior of these households consisted 
of  owning marginal unused rooms. For a discussion of  this phenomenon and its 
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Specification of the rental price series for rental housing is at least as 
difficult. Investigators generally use an observed market rent index such 
as the CPI rent component.13  The real rent index  (using the CPI net of 
shelter as a deflator and scaled to  equal  10 percent in  1960:2)  is the 
smooth series plotted in the figure. As an alternative, an equilibrium user 
cost for rental housing is calculated. In the long-run equilibrium, the ob- 
served rent index should converge to this value. There are two advantages 
of using the ratio of the equilibrium user cost for owner-occupied housing 
to the user cost for rental housing in equations explaining tenure choice. 
First, these series are comparable conceptually.  (Because  no  rents are 
observed for owner-occupied housing, it is not possible to compare mar- 
ket rents for owner-occupied and rental housing.)  Second, errors in the 
measurement of expected inflation and financing rates tend to cancel out. 
As can be seen in figure 2, the ratio of the user cost for owner-occupied 
housing to the rental user cost is a smoother series than the ratio of the 
former to the market index. 
In contrast to the user costs for owner-occupied housing, the real user 
cost for rental housing (figure 1) shows no discernible trend over the past 
twenty-five years, although there is a slight bulge in the early 1960s. The 
failure of this cost to decline sharply between 1964 and late 1978 in the 
face of  an estimated 5 percentage point fall in the real after-tax mort- 
gage rate (for landlords in the 50 percent tax bracket) occurred because 
of two factors: the tax reform legislation of  1969 and 1976 and the ac- 
celeration of inflation. The reform legislation created a minimum tax on 
accelerated depreciation and capital gains, increased the proportion of 
accelerated depreciation subject to recapture, and lengthened the mini- 
mum interval over which the interest and property taxes incurred during 
the construction period can be amortized; inflation eroded the real value 
of tax depreciation, which is based on historical cost. Thus the ratio of 
the real user cost for owner-occupied housing to that for rental housing 
has fallen. For households in the 15 percent tax bracket the ratio shown 
in figure 2 declines from 0.8 in 1959 to 0.5 in 1978; for the 30 percent 
bracket, the decline is from 0.7 to 0.2. This general decrease in the rela- 
tive cost of homeownership is broadly consistent with the observed rise 
in the adjusted homeownership rate. 
13. For example, see Harvey S. Rosen and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Federal Taxes 
and Homeownership:  Evidence from Time Series,"  Joiurnal of Political Economy, 
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The size and quality of the housing demanded by a homeowner is as- 
sumed to  be related to  the permanent real disposable  income  of  that 
owner. The proxy for this variable is an average of recent values of real 
disposable income per household. This variable (four-quarter average) 
rose from $9,000  (1972  prices)  in 1960 to more than $12,000  in 1978. 
Rosen finds that income also affects the tenure choice because households 
with higher income are more likely to own.14 He attributes this to any of 
three hypotheses: ownership per se is a superior good; risk aversion de- 
clines with income; or financial constraints decline with income. The rise 
in income during the  1960-78  period is consistent with the increase in 
the adjusted homeownership rate, and its significance is tested below. 
VARIABLES  MEASURING  CREDIT-MARKET  CONDITIONS 
If interest rates rise one-for-one  with increases in expected inflation, 
such increases raise the demand for housing per owner-occupied  unit. 
This is because mortgage interest is tax deductible and interest income 
from financial assets, the usual alternative to own equity investment in 
houses, is taxable-in  other words, the financing cost and rate of expected 
capital appreciation rise equally, but the latter is not taxed while the former 
is deductible. This effect is captured by the real user cost  variable de- 
scribed above. 
James Kearl, following William Poole, argues that this is not the end of 
the story because the increased financing cost impinges on the buyer im- 
mediately while the appreciation gain occurs in the future.15 If lenders 
are unwilling to make funds available on the basis of these future expected 
gains and households cannot either (1)  meet the higher mortgage pay- 
ments by borrowing in other forms or by rechanneling their savings to 
housing equity from other assets, or (2)  reduce the payments by reallo- 
cating more wealth to housing at the time of purchase, the quantity of 
housing demanded by such households will be reduced. That is, increases 
in expected inflation will not stimulate the real value of the average hous- 
ing start as much as the user-cost analysis suggests; in fact, increased in- 
flation could even reduce demand. 
14. Rosen, "Housing Decisions," pp. 13-14. 
15. Kearl, "Inflation, Mortgages and Housing"; and William Poole, "Housing 
Finance under Inflationary  Conditions,"  in Ways to Moderate  Fluctuations  in  Holus- 
ing Construction,  Federal Reserve Staff Study (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve  System, 1972), pp. 355-76. -,  C)  cl)  O 
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A  variable that should capture the impact of this mortgage-payment 
constraint is the ratio of net-of-tax mortgage payments on the desired real 
value of a house to disposable income per household, assuming 75 per- 
cent financing at the current mortgage rate. But the desired real value of 
a house in the absence of this constraint is unknown. I assume that the 
desired real value of a house would have risen proportionately with the 
rise in real disposable income per household. The mortgage-payment con- 
straint is then based on the real cost of a constant-quality house, taken 
to be the average new home constructed in  1974,  deflated by real dis- 
posable  income  per household-all  in  1956:1  prices. The  fraction of 
disposable income that would be absorbed by net-of-tax mortgage pay- 
ments of a household in the 30 percent tax bracket is shown in figure 3. 
A number of characteristics of this series are of interest. First, the fraction 
was  only  marginally higher in  the  1969-72  period-0.110-than  the 
approximately 0.095  that existed in  1960.  Second, the fraction periodi- 
cally increased by 25 to 30 percent during periods of normal (roughly 2 
percentage points)  increases in the mortgage rate (1966-69,  1971-74, 
1977-78).  Third, the fraction rose by an extraordinary amount in 1979 
and early 1980.  The current fraction, based on a 13 percent mortgage 
rate (0.21),  is nearly double the 1971 level.16 
The availability of funds at the traditional mortgage financing institu- 
tions  and mortgage support by the federally sponsored credit agencies 
also are seen by many to be an important determinant of housing produc- 
tion, although there is much controversy regarding this issue. Jaffee and 
Rosen  are probably the best-known advocates of the role of availability 
and have reported empirical results of an incredibly large impact.17  How- 
ever, the most extreme position on availability is that incorporated in the 
recent specification of the housing sector in the Federal Reserve Board 
model, in which starts are determined solely by a credit-availability vari- 
16. This is a slight overstatement because of the tendency for people with con- 
stant real incomes to be in increasingly higher tax brackets during the past fifteen 
years. 
17. Jaffee and Rosen in "Mortgage Credit Availability" report that $1 billion 
increase in annual deposit inflows increases single-family housing starts by  15,000 
units (p. 351)  and multifamily starts by 16,000 units (p. 353). At average prices of 
$60,000 (p. 351, note 16) and $50,000 (my estimate), the value of starts would rise 
by $1.7 billion. Given that thrift institutions  use most of their funds to finance  exist- 
ing house transactions  at current prices, this estimate seems at least four times too 
high even for those who believe in the impact of mortgage availability. See the dis- 
cussion of equations 3-2 through 3-5 below. 412  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
able in the 1960: 1-1960:3,  1966:3-1967:1  ,1969:2-1970:1,  and 1973: 
3-1975:1  periods.18  On the other hand, Paul de Rosa, and Allan Meltzer 
earlier, could find no impact of credit availability.1'9  Although much dis- 
agreement exists about the impact of availability on the short-run housing 
cycle, there appears to be general agreement that credit availability has 
not affected the long-run housing stock,20 that is, the subsequent reinter- 
mediation of deposits induces production to replace that lost during the 
previous period of disintermediation. 
Following  Jaffee and Rosen,  the credit-availability measures in this 
paper are based on the sum of thrift institution deposits, Federal Home 
Loan  Bank Board advances, and home mortgage holdings of  federally 
sponsored credit agencies. This sum-adjusted  deposits  (DEPA)  mea- 
sured in  millions,  deflated by  the  residential construction  deflator-is 
shown in figure 3 as real adjusted deposits (DEPAR).  Two measures of 
availability based on adjusted deposits are tested. The first is the average 
change in adjusted deposits in the previous two quarters, the short lag 
reflecting the commitment process, divided by the price of  a constant- 
quality house (PCQH)-that  is, the real value of the increase in adjusted 
deposits.  This variable, ADEPA/PCQH,  is very close  to  that used  by 
Jaffee and Rosen and is denoted by JRAA.  It represents the number (in 
thousands)  of constant-quality houses that could be purchased with the 
change in adjusted deposits. A  reservation about this variable is that it 
suggests that housing production is always affected by availability; either 
a shortage of funds restricts production or a surplus of funds allows previ- 
ously  lost  production to  catch up. This variable ignores the impact of 
inflation on the purchasing power of the existing stock of deposits, deposits 
that are constantly being used to finance houses that are rolling over at 
higher prices. 
According  to  the second  specification, availability is assumed to  be 
18. The model is discussed in Neil  G.  Berkman, "Mortgage Finance and the 
Housing  Cycle,"  New  England  Economic  Review  (September-October  1979), 
pp.  54-76. 
19. Paul de Rosa, "Mortgage Rationing and Residential Investment: Some Re- 
sults from  a Brainard-Tobin  Model," Jouirnal of Money,  Credit, and Banking,  vol.  10 
(February 1978), pp. 75-87;  and Allan H. Meltzer, "Credit  Availability and Eco- 
nomic Decisions: Some Evidence from the Mortgage and Housing Markets,"  Jolur- 
nal of Finance, vol. 29 (June 1974), pp. 763-77. 
20.  See Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Estimates  of the Effectiveness 
of Stabilization  Policies for the Mortgage  and Housing Markets,"  Jolurnal of Finance, 
vol. 33 (June 1978), p. 933. Patric H. Hendershott  413 
restricted when the average quarterly  growth rate in real adjusted deposits 
during the previous two quarters is less than one-quarter percent; it is 
assumed to remain restricted until future growth brings real adjusted de- 
posits above the one-quarter percent trend line from the point just before 
the period of restriction. Subsequent growth above the trend line is as- 
sumed to induce catch-up production until the net impact on production 
is zero.21 Both this variable, AA,  and the deflated average change in ad- 
justed deposits, JRAA,  are shown in figure 4. Although the AA  series 
oscillates around zero (always equaling zero between bouts of availability 
constraint), the Jaffee-Rosen variable is more like a step function. Between 
1965:1  and 1970:3  the series averages 130; between 1970:4  and 1978:4 
it averages 300.  Moreover, all values in the latter period exceed every 
value in the earlier period. Thus the precise interpretation of this variable 
is highly uncertain. 
It has been suggested that the availability measure should be expanded 
to account for the increased mortgage financing by nontraditional lenders. 
More specifically, some have advocated adding mortgage pools or Gov- 
ernment National Mortgage Association  (GNMA)  pass-through securi- 
ties to adjusted deposits.22  This seems inappropriate for a number of rea- 
sons. First, pools denote a type of mortgage financing instrument rather 
than a sector that finances residential construction; the underlying financ- 
ing is provided by households and a wide variety of financial institutions. 
In  fact,  because  thrift institutions hold  roughly 25  percent of  GNMA 
securities, the addition of pools to adjusted deposits would constitute sig- 
nificant double counting. Second, the holdings of pool securities by non- 
thrift institutions are actual holdings of mortgages, while adjusted thrift 
institution deposits  are funds that could support mortgage holdings. If 
nonthrift pools were to be included in an availability variable, logic dic- 
tates that the variable should be all mortgage holdings or mortgages out- 
standing, rather  than these pools plus thrift institution deposits.23  Although 
it is likely that a close relation between housing outlays and changes in 
21.  Let At  -  DEPARt  -  (1.0025)tDEPAR,,,  where  DEPAR,,  is the  value  dur- 
ing the quarter  before the restricted  period. The value of A is initially negative and 
then takes on positive values until -,At for a given episode equals zero. The avail- 
ability variable,  AAt, equals 1/2  (At__  + A  t2). 
22.  See the comments on  Jaffee and Rosen, "Mortgage Credit Availability," 
pp. 377-86. 
23. The recently estimated housing sector model of the Federal Reserve moves 
in this direction (see note 18). 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
-  ~~~~~~~0  -~~~~~~~~~~~1 
E 
oo  0 
--  44~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l 
0  C 
-  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
.0C 
=0 
en  0Z Patric H. Hendershott  415 
this series (total mortgage purchases or issuances)  exists, it seems more 
likely  that the outlays cause  the mortgage issuances than the  reverse. 
Inclusion of mortgage purchases or issuances in housing equations would 
give rise to highly spurious results. The expansion of secondary mortgage 
markets has integrated the mortgage market more closely  with capital 
markets generally.24  This should reduce the impact of the rationing vari- 
ables in the most recent  (1979-80)  cycle.  In fact, if the integration is 
substantial, the unavailability of mortgage credit should no longer be a 
problem and forecasts of  1979-80  that exclude  any availability effect 
should be more accurate. 
Tenure Choice2 
The  adjusted homeownership rate, HO/HOA,  is related to the four 
basic  determinants discussed  above:  the ratio of  the real user cost  of 
owner-occupied housing, c, to the cost of renting, r, measured by either 
the real rental user cost  or the rent component of  the CPI; the mort- 
gage-payment constraint, m; credit availability, AA;  and real disposable 
income per household, y: 
(2)  HO /HOA  =  6Q, m,  AA, y). 
The expected signs of the partial derivatives are negative for c/r  and m; 
positive for AA;  and unknown for y. The real user costs are tested for 
homeowners in both the 15 percent and the 30 percent tax brackets. 
It is  reasonable to  expect  long  lags in the adjustment of  the home- 
ownership rate to changes in its fundamental determinants. An increase 
in the economic  attractiveness of homeownership must be perceived by 
the household; a decision must be made regarding the explicit form and 
location of the house; and the house must be constructed (or converted 
from a rental unit).  The first two lags might be short for some households 
and a small increase in the homeownership ratio could be achieved through 
24.  For a discussion of secondary mortgage markets and the integration of the 
mortgage  market,  see Patric H. Hendershott  and Kevin E. Villani, "Secondary  Mort- 
gage Markets and the Cost of  Mortgage Funds," Jouirnial of  the Americani  Real 
Estate  anid Urbani Econiomics  Association,  vol.  8  (Spring  1980),  pp.  50-76. 
25. This section is based in part on Hendershott  and Shilling, "The Economics of 
Tenure  Choice." D  C'os  t 
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a drop in unsold or vacant existing houses, but the full response to a sig- 
nificant decline in the cost of homeowners-hip  undoubtedly does not occur 
for a number of years. Because the responses are expected to build up for 
a time and then taper off, a stock-adjustment model was not used. Rather, 
combinations of weighted averages and polynomial distributed lags were 
tested. The lag weights of the distribution were assumed to lie along a 
third-degree polynomial  (with no end-point constraints),  and the length 
of the lag was extended as long as the expected negative or positive rela- 
tions held. Both linear and logarithmic forms were estimated. 
The mortgage-payment constraint variable and the credit-availability 
variable have not had significant impacts on tenure choice. This is true 
regardless of  the  form  of  the equation  estimated or  the  assumed tax 
bracket of  the household.  Estimates excluding these variables are pre- 
sented in table  1. The income variable is statistically significant in the 
second equation only; the user-cost variables perform as expected in all 
equations.26  The standard errors of the equations, including the ratios of 
the user costs, are about 25 percent less than those of the equations using 
the market rent index. 
The weights on the lagged user-cost ratios in equations 1-1 through 1-4 
are summarized by quarters in table 2. Both the humped weight pattern 
and the nearly five-year period for complete adjustment seem plausible. 
The estimated response when the 30 percent tax bracket and the rental 
user cost are used is somewhat less rapid than that in the other formula- 
tions; 14 percent of the response occurs within two years rather than the 
28 to 33 percent response in the other equations. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients on the different user-cost ratios in 
these equations indicate large and similar effects from observed changes 
in the different user-cost measures. The estimated impact in equation 1-1 
of the observed decline in the ratio accounts for 66  percent of the ob- 
26.  These equations appear to suffer from substantial  autocorrelation  even after 
the semidifference  transformation,  but this is deceiving. Examination  of the residuals 
of the equations reveals a distinct annual clustering, that is, the residuals for the 
period from 1960:3 to 1961:2 are similar; a jump occurs in 1961:3; and the pattern 
is repeated. (This phenomenon  follows from the construction  of the data. Only an- 
nual data are available for both the number  of homeowners and the adjusted  home- 
owners; this ratio is calculated for the second quarter  of the year and interpolated 
linearly between second quarters.) When the residuals are averaged for each of the 
eighteen annual clusters and computed Durbin-Watson  statistics are based on these, 
the result is statistics greater than 2. 41 8  Brnnkin.,v  Paner.v nn Fcnnnmir  A rtivitvY  2:1980 
Table 2.  Lagged Responses to User-Cost Ratios,  1960:3-1978:4 
Number of quarters laggeda 
Twenity 
Twelve  Sixteeni  to 
Zero  to  Foutr  to  Eight to  to  to  twenity- 
Equiation  thiree  seveii  eleveni  fifteent  ,ziiieteeni  two 
1  15 percent  tax bracket  0.12  0.16  0.23  0.26  0.20  0.04 
Rental user  cost  (2.8)  (4.3)  (6.9)  (7.5)  (4.4)  (1.0) 
1-230  percent  tax bracket  0.05  0.09  0.20  0.30  0.28  0.07 
Rental user  cost  (1.0)  (2.4)  (6.8)  (8.4)  (6.0)  (2.3) 
1-3  15 percent  tax bracket  0.15  0.18  0.20  0.20  0.19  0.08 
CPI rent index  (2.3)  (3.3)  (3.5)  (4.4)  (4.4)  (2.3) 
1-4  30 percent  tax bracket  0.15  0.16  0.19  0.21  0.20  0.09 
CPI rent index  (2.8)  (3.0)  (5.1)  (5.7)  (5.2)  (3.2) 
Sources:  Same  as  table  1. 
a.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  absolute  values  of  t-statistics. 
served increase in the adjusted homeownership rate between early 1960 
and the end of  1978, while the impact of the decline based on equation 
1-2 explains 56 percent of the increase. If the ratio of user costs had not 
fallen over this period, 3.5  to 4.0  million fewer households would have 
been homeowners at the end of  1978 than the observed 50 million. Put 
another way, the homeownership rate would have been about 60 percent, 
rather than the observed 65 percent. 
These results are roughly comparable to those of Harvey and Kenneth 
Rosen.27 The Rosens  relate the homeownership rate annually over the 
1949-74  period to the ratio of user costs, per capita real consumption 
(a proxy for permanent income),  a credit-availability variable (the real 
growth rate in deposits of thrift institutions),  and demographic variables 
(their  dependent variable being the observed homeownership rate, not 
the adjusted rate). The greatest difference between the Rosens' results and 
mine is in the treatment of demographic variables. Through construction 
of the adjusted homeownership ratio, demographic factors in my analysis 
are forced to cause a reduction in the unadjusted ratio from 0.62 in 1960 
to 0.58 in 1974.28 The Rosens, in contrast, find no impact for such factors. 
27.  Rosen and Rosen, "Federal  Taxes and Homeownership." 
28. Jaffee and Rosen, "Mortgage  Credit Availability,"  p. 345. Jaffee kindly sup- 
plied me with both the HO and HOA series used in their analysis. Patric H. Hendershott  419 
They do find income to be a significant determinant (as I did in equation 
1-2)  and credit availability to be insignificant  (with a t-statistic of 1.3). 
The most striking similarity in the Rosens' and my results can be seen in 
the user-cost ratio. They, too, find a significant, much-delayed response 
(with the peak adjustment occurring in the third year following a change 
in the user-cost ratio). To provide an indication of the magnitude of their 
estimated response, they compute the long-run value of the homeowner- 
ship rate in 1974 on the assumption that property taxes and interest were 
not tax deductible. The calculated value is 0.60 compared to the observed 
value of 0.64.29  I have attempted to perform the same experiment, which 
consists of recomputing the homeownership user costs without the deduc- 
tions, obtaining the impact of these changes on HO/HOA  in equations 
1-1 and 1-2, and transforming these changes into impacts on HOIHH, 
the observed homeownership rate. The results are 0.590  (the tax rate at 
15 percent)  and 0.575  (the tax rate at 30 percent).  These calculations 
suggest approximately the same sensitivity of  tenure choice  to  relative 
prices as that obtained by the Rosens.3" 
Number of Housing Starts 
The data on starts an-d  their value do not refer to houses occupied by 
owners but to one-to-four family units. These houses can be occupied by 
owners, HO; can be rented, NR; or can be vacant, NV. Thus the change 
in uses of such housing, AN, is 
(3)  AN=  AHO  + ANR  + ANV. 
The change in the stock of houses is the sum of completed starts, CST, 
and conversions from multifamily units, CONV, minus removals, REM: 
(4)  AN =  CST +  CONV -  REM. 
By definition, there is ex post equality between A\N  in equations 3 and 4; 
ex ante, equality is unlikely. 
29.  Rosen and Rosen, "Federal  Taxes and Homeownership,"  p. 68. 
30. When the homeownership  equation was estimated in logarithmic form and 
this experiment  was performed, the calculated value of the homeownership  rate in 
1974 was 0.60 for either cost of capital. 420  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
Single-family starts are generally completed about three months (one 
quarter) after they are initiated. Prices of new units are assumed to be a 
markup on costs, and builders are assumed to set current starts, ST, to 
match expected demand. In the aggregate, combining equations 3 and 4 
implies 
(5)  ST =  CST+1  =  AHO+1  +  ANR+1  +ANV+1  -  CONV1  +  REM+1, 
where the superscript denotes expected desired future changes. 
The major force determining housing starts has almost certainly been 
the expected change in homeownership and, possibly, expected removals. 
Ex post conversions and changes in unsold new units have been relatively 
small, and changes in the number rented must have been minor. Conver- 
sions averaged 17,000  a year in the 1970-75  period, and rose to 20,000 
in  1976,  45,000  in  1977,  and 80,000  in  1978.3'  The annual change in 
unsold new single-family houses measured at year-end exceeded 75,000 
only once between 1963 and 1979. In contrast, the mean annual level of 
one-to-four family housing starts in the 1976-79  period was 1,140,000. 
Three variables reflect expectations of future increases in the demand 
for owner-occupied housing. These are recent observed changes in home- 
ownership, the projected average growth in homeownership during the 
next year because of the growth in households in the different demographic 
classes (the projected growth in HOA ), and the expected long-run change 
in homeownership due to anticipated adjustments to the user-cost ratio. 
The first two variables are measured as the observed average change in 
homeownership during the current and previous three quarters, ACHO, 
and the change in adjusted homeownership during the next four quarters, 
ACHOA.  The last variable, LRUC,  is based on equation 1-1,  the ad- 
justed homeownership rate. Recall from table 1 that 
HO  E  w(c 
HOA 
ao-  a  , 
wir- 
31. An additional  increase  to 135,000 occurred in 1979. These are high estimates 
of owner-occupied  houses created because an entire property is considered as con- 
verted if a single unit in a rental building or complex has been sold as a condo- 
minium and because the new owners can rent the units rather  than occupy them. See 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Division of Policy Studies, Thle 
Conversion  of  Rental  Housing  to  Condominiums  and  Cooperatives:  A  National 
Study  of Scope,  Causes,  and Impacts  (U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1980),  pp. 
IV-4 through  IV-5. Patric H. Hendershott  421 
where  2wi =  1.  The  long-run expected  adjusted homeownership rate, 
assuming that the current user-cost ratio continues in the future, is 
HO*  c 
HOA  r 
Thus  the long-run change in homeownership that will result from full 
adjustment to the current  user-cost ratio is 
LRUC =  al [  wi)  _  c  HOA. 
This variable is uniformly (with one minor exception)  positive through- 
out the estimation period but turns sharply negative in late 1979 and early 
1980. 
Housing  starts may also  be  affected by the availability of  mortgage 
credit. Allowing  for  the  possible  impact of  the  two  credit-availability 
variables yields the following general relation: 
(6)  ST =  q5(ACHO,  ACHOA, LRUC, AA, JRAA), 
where starts are related positively to components in the 4 function. 
Some estimates of a linear version of equation 6 are presented in table 
3*32 Equations 3-1 and 3-2 are estimated both with and without the auto- 
correlation correction. In equation 3-1 the coefficients are all statistically 
significant with the expected sign. Moreover, the long-run impact of  a 
change in homeownership on starts is close to one-for-one; the sum of the 
products of  the coefficients on  the three homeownership variables and 
their means is 272 as compared with 257, the mean annual average change 
in homneownership.  However, the equation exhibits significant autocorre- 
lation. When the correction for this is made in equation 3-2,  the coeffi- 
cients on change in homeownership imply a response of starts to increases 
in homeownership that is too large. To reduce the response, the constant 
term was arbitrarily  constrained to -50,  slightly more than the constant 
in 3-1.  As shown in 3-3,  this does not reduce the explanatory power of 
32. A case easily can be made that the credit-availability  variables should enter 
multiplicatively  with the homeownership  variables. However, this is complicated by 
the fact that some variables alternate  by sign (LRUC and AA)  and by difficulties  in 
simulating  disturbances  with a multiplicative  equation. *13  0 
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the relation, but the response of starts to changes in homeownership is 
lowered appropriately. (The  sum of  the products of  the means of  the 
three homeownership variables and their coefficients is 254.) 
The coefficients on the availability variables in equation 3-3 imply that 
an increase in deposits of  $1 billion in  1978 would raise starts by just 
under 7,000  units.33 This is only 45  percent of the impact reported by 
Jaffee and Rosen.  Even my relatively small estimated impact on starts 
suggests that 31 percent of incremental funds of thrift institutions is used 
to finance new construction of one-to-four family houses,34  and this is im- 
plausibly large. Only 20 percent of the loans from savings and loan insti- 
tutions  (net of refinancings) that were closed  during each of the years 
from  1976  to  1979  were used for this purpose,35 and the fraction was 
surely lower for mutual savings banks because of their large investments 
in commercial mortgages and corporate bonds. The results of Jaffee and 
Rosen suggest 68 percent financing of new single-family construction.36 
One interpretation of availability coefficients that are implausibly large 
is that the availability variable is correlated with credit shortages at other 
institutions such as commercial banks. This may be the case; however, the 
policy implications that follow from this interpretation-and  the type of 
policy simulations that would be appropriate-are  quite different from 
those of a pure thrift-institution availability effect. Suppose, for example, 
that an availability coefficient implies that an increase of  $1  billion  in 
thrift institution deposits raises starts by 7,000, but that the effect is really 
an increase of 5,000 units due to thrift institution deposits and an increase 
of 2,000  units due to a simultaneous increase in deposits at commercial 
banks. A policy that increases thrift institution deposits by $1 billion at 
the expense of bank deposits, such as creating a deposit rate differential, 
would increase starts by 3,000, rather  than by 7,000. 
33.  AST  = 0.344/0.06  + 2.038/1.81  - 6.86, where 0.06 is the price of a constant- 
quality house (in millions of dollars) and 1.81 is the residential  construction  deflator 
(1972 =  1.0) in 1978. 
34. PCQHAST/\DEPA  =  0.344 +  [(0.06)(2.038)]/1.81  =  0.412. Assuming a 
loan-to-value ratio of 75 percent, the new construction absorbs 31 percent of incre- 
mental  deposits. 
35.  Federal  Home  Loant Bank  Board  Jolurnal, vol.  13  (September  1980),  table 
S.4.5,  p. 46. 
36. The 68 percent is obtained by multiplying  the loan-to-value ratio by 90 (see 
Jaffee and Rosen, "Mortgage  Credit Availability,"  p. 351, note 16). They obtain a 
similar estimate for financing of multifamily housing even though only 3 percent 
of loans closed at savings and loan institutions  finance  new multifamily construction. "-4) 
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Average Quality of Housing Starts 
The quality of housing desired by each homeowner (based on number 
of square feet, fireplaces, and other characteristics), Q*, is a function of 
y, c, and  mr  37 
(7)  Q  =  (y  c, nm). 
The rise in y noted above and the decline in c should have increased the 
quality of the average housing start over time, while the rise in m should 
have mitigated the increase. 
Figure 5 illustrates two measures of the quality of the average housing 
start. The first is the value of one-to-four family starts divided by the resi- 
dential construction deflator (equal to  1.0 in 1972)  and the number of 
starts. The second is the ratio of the price of the average new house sold 
to the price of the constant-quality house multiplied by $22,700,  the cost 
of the constant-quality house in 1963: 1 prices.38  The two measures track 
quite closely for the  1963-77  period; they rise from less than $20,000 
(1972  prices)  in 1963 to $23,000  in 1968,  decline to about $20,000  in 
1970-71,  and climb to about $24,000  in late 1976 and early 1977. The 
series move quite differently thereafter. The deflated-value series declines 
sharply, while the price-ratio series rises modestly through 1979:2  and 
then dips. Both the questionable quality of the value series, which is con- 
structed from data on building permits, and evidence that the quality of 
single-family houses rose between 1977 and 1979 point toward the price- 
ratio series as the more reliable one.39 
37. In an early study L. Jay Atkinson explained the average acquisition price for 
new single-family  homes with mortgages  issued by the U.S. Federal Housing Admin- 
istration annually for 1947-64. See "Factors Affecting the Purchase Value of New 
Houses," Survey of Current  Buisiness, vol. 46 (August 1966), pp. 20-36.  Regressors 
included  income, the real price of a standardized  FHA house, and the initial monthly 
mortgage  payment.  All variables  performed  as expected. 
38. The series are published by the U.S.  Bureau of  the Census, Construlction 
Reports,  series C27,  Price  Index  of New  One-Family  Houses  Sold. 
39. The median square feet in newly constructed  homes rose from 1,535 in 1975 
to 1,610 in 1977 and on to 1,645 in 1979. See Census Bureau, Construction  Reports, 
series  C25,  Characteristics  of  New  Houising, 1979  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce, 
1979), table 15, p. 37. In addition, the percentages  of new homes with two or more 
garages, one or more fireplaces, air conditioning, and two or more baths all rose 
between  1975 and  1977  and between  1977  and  1979. 426  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
The low real value of the average start in 1970-71  cannot be explained 
by the underlying income  and price variables. Rather, it appears to be 
attributable to a surge in lower-quality, subsidized single-family starts in 
that period. If the quality of the average subsidized start equals Q -X, 
where Q is the quality of an unsubsidized start and X is a constant, the 
quality of the average start, QA, is 
QA  =  Q -X 
where NS/N  is the ratio of subsidized starts to total starts. Data on the 
number of subsidized starts were not readily available, but the value of 
these starts, (Q  -  X)N8,  was. The ratio of this series to the total value of 
one-to-four family housing starts rose from zero in  1969:1  to 0.147  in 
1971:1,  fell to 0.048  in 1973:3,  remained in the 0.027  to 0.066  range 
through 1977:4,  and was 0.005 in 1978. Next, define 




(8)  QA  =  Q -  X'SUB, 
where X' =  X[Q,l/ (Q  -  X) ] and the term in brackets measures the ratio 
of average quality to subsidized quality. Replacing Q by Q*, substituting 
7 into 8, linearizing, and allowing for partial adjustment yields 
(9)  IAQA  =  aoX +  a,Xy -  a2Xc  -  a3Xm  -  XX'SUB -  XQA-i, 
where X' is now treated as part of the estimated coefficient on SUB and 
is interpreted to satisfy equation 8 with the other variables at their mean 
values, and where the a are long-run coefficients and X is the adjustment 
parameter. 
Equations 4-1  and 4-2  in table 4  are estimates of  equation 9,  after 
adding  QA  -,to  both  sides,  for  the  two  different measures of  average 
quality. As  can be seen, the price-ratio series is much better explained 
than the value-deflated series, although all except one of the coefficients 
are correct]y signed and statistically different from zero. The estimated 
speeds of adjustment, 0.40  and 0.59,  are quite rapid. The coefficient on Patric H. Hendershott  427 
the SUB variable implies that the average value of subsidized starts was 
56 percent of the average value of nonsubsidized starts.40  This seems a 
little low. 
The long-run elasticities of the equations in table 4, evaluated at the 
means, are as follows: 
Mortgage-payment 
Real income  constraint  Real user cost 
4-1  0.43  -0.43  -0.21 
4-2  0.68  -0.16  -0.10 
4-3  0.47  -0.23  -0.18 
4-4  0.36  -0.26  -0.22 
Equation 4-2  uses  the preferred quality variable. In that equation, the 
income  elasticity, 0.68,  is close  to that estimated from microeconomic 
data, but the price elasticities, -0.10  for the user cost and -0.16  for the 
mortgage-payment constraint, are far lower in absolute value than those 
obtained from microeconomic data.41  To test the sensitivity of equation 
4-2 to changes in the price elasticities, the equation was reestimated with 
the coefficient on the user cost constrained to a larger (absolute)  value. 
As equations 4-3  and 4-4 indicate, little explanatory power is lost when 
the user-cost elasticity is constrained to be twice or more than twice as 
large. This also raises the elasticity with respect to the mortgage-payment 
constraint; however, a disadvantage is that the income elasticity falls. The 
forecast experiments discussed below determine which of the equations 
in table 4 is to be used in the policy simulations. 
Simulation Model 
A number of simulation experiments can be performed to test the vi- 
ability of the estimated equations, to illustrate their implications, and to 
40.  From equation 8, Q =  QA  +  X' SUB, where bars over variables indicate 
mean values. With Q.l =  $21,950 (1972 prices), SUB =  0.04, and X' =  17.0 (from 
the estimated coefficients in equation 4-2),  this yields Q =  $22,630. Solving for X 
from the definition of X' yields X =  $9,880. Thus the implied mean value of sub- 
sidized  starts, Q -  X,  is $12,750. 
41.  Rosen, "Housing  Decisions," p. 15, reports on income elasticity of 0.76 and 
a price elasticity of -0.96.  The price elasticity does not reflect  a response  to expected 
inflation  because  this variable  did not vary across households. .  (L)  C  . 
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increase understanding of behavior in the housing sector during the past 
twenty years. These  are reported in the following  sections.  Before de- 
scribing them, the model is summarized and a few issues regarding its 
form are addressed. 
The housing sector model that will be simulated is shown in figure 6. 
The boxes enclosed by double lines contain the three variables that have 
been explained empirically in equations 1-1, 3-3,  and 4-2.  The financial 
variables that influence the explained variables, which were calculated 
before the estimation, are enclosed in circles. Note that the variable for 
credit availability and the mortgage-payment constraint affect the number 
and quality of starts, respectively, while user costs have an impact on both 
(the number of starts being influenced by the tenure decision).  The proxi- 
mate determinants of these calculated financial variables are listed at the 
left of the figure: interest rates, tax law, and the financial structure.  Under- 
lying these variables and directly affecting some of the behavioral rela- 
tions are household formation, productivity growth, and inflation. 
Equations to explain the real value of starts and the change in housing 
stock (at the right of the figure) must still be specified. As already men- 
tioned, the real value of total starts, HS, is simply the product of the num- 
ber of starts and the real value per start. To obtain a relation for the real 
housing stock, K,  the following  equation was estimated for the period 
from 1960:2  to 1978:4  to translate the real value of starts into the real 
stock: 
(10) 
K =  1. 681 +  0. 1307HS +  0. 1252HS-1 +  0. 01  56HS-2  +  0.9940K-1, 
(6.3)  (7.1)  (4.6)  (0.8)  (1926) 
PK =  1.0;  standard  error  =  0.28;  Durbin-Watson  =  0.76. 
The coefficients differ slightly from those expected:  1.00 on K_1,  0.25 on 
the sum of the HS coefficients (with the value of starts measured at an- 
nual rates), and zero for the constant term.42  These expectations are based 
42.  The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  An alternative,  possibly  preferred, 
equation  that corrects  for autocorrelation  and constrains  the constant  term to zero  is 
K =  0.0990  HS  +  0.1272  HS-1  +  0.0322  HS_2  +  0.9969 K-1  +  0.785  Rho, 
(6.5)  (8.4)  (2.1)  (1465)  (10.5) 
P2  =  1.0; standard error  =  0.23;  Durbin-Watson  =  2.31. 4- Patric H. Hendershott  431 
on the fact that real outlays on additions and alterations approximately 
equal economic depreciation.4" 
The model was not extended to incorporate feedback effects because 
no relatively straightforward  extension seemed useful. The most obvious 
extension would be to make the relative price of housing endogenous (the 
price of a constant-quality house divided by the CPI net of shelter).  An 
exogenous increase in the demand for single-family housing might be ex- 
pected to raise this price, which, by raising both the real user cost, c, and 
the mortgage-payment constraint, m, would cushion the increase in de- 
mand.44 The difficulty with this extension is that the market for single- 
family housing is not isolated from markets for other structures.15  One 
indication of  the substitutability within the construction industry is the 
close correlations among the series for constant-quality house prices, the 
deflator for all residential structures, and the deflator for nonresidential 
structures. For example, between the beginning of  1968 and 1980 these 
series increased by 178,  171, and 177 percent, respectively. To explain 
the relative price of structures would require modeling the demands for 
multifamily housing and nonresidential structures as well as the supply 
of structures. 
The increases in the price indexes for structures mentioned above are 
much greater than those in indexes of prices of other major components of 
aggregate output. For example, the increases during the same  1968-80 
interval in the deflators for consumer durables, producers' durables, and 
nondurable consumption, respectively, were only 69, 96, and 120 percent. 
This may raise questions regarding the extent of simultaneous equations 
bias in the demand equation for average quality and the absence of the 
real price of  housing from the supply equation for housing starts. My 
43.  The  ratio  of  the  real value  of  additions  and  alterations  (annual  rate)  to  the 
real stock  of  single-family  housing  was  0.011  for  the  fourth  quarters of  1965,  1970, 
1975,  and  1978  (data  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Board).  The  annual  depreciation 
rate for  residential  housing  during  the  1950-70  period  was  recently  estimated  to be 
0.010.  See Wilhelmina  A. Leigh,  "Economic  Depreciation  of the Residential  Housing 
Stock  of  the  United  States,  1950-70,"  Reviewi, of  Economics  anid Statistics,  vol.  62 
(May  1980),  pp. 200-06. 
44.  James  R.  Kearl,  "Inflation  and  Relative  Price  Distortions:  The  Case  of 
Housing,"  Review, of  Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  60  (November  1978),  pp. 609- 
14. 
45.  See  Craig  Swan,  "Labor  and  Material  Requirements  for  Housing,"  BPEA, 
2:1971,  pp.  347-77,  and  William  E.  Gibson,  "Protecting  Homebuilding  from  Re- 
strictive  Credit  Conditions,"  BPEA,  3:1973,  pp. 647-91. 432  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
Table 5.  Determinants of the Rise in the Real Price of Structures, Demand, 
Selected Periods,  1955-79 
Percent 
Share of real outlays on 
structures in real GNP  Chlantge  in the ratio of 
structures deflator 
Period  Residenitial  Total  to GNP deflator 
1955-59  4.78  8.74  -2.0 
1960-64  4.82  8.65  -7.0 
1965-69  3.98  8.12  4.0 
1970-74  4.37  8.08  11.0 
1975-79  3.83  6.94  11.0 
Source:  Econiomiiic Report  of  the  Preside,it,  January,  1980,  tables  B-2,  B-3,  pp.  204-07.  The  structures 
deflator-  is  measured  as  a  simiiple average  of  the  deflators  for  residential  and  nonresidential  structures. 
treatment has implicitly assumed that the rise in the real price is deter- 
mined by supply, not demand, factors and thus the real price is largely 
exogenous to household demand and irrelevant to builders' supply. This 
treatment contrasts markedly with recent work by Lawrence Summers 
and James Poterba in which the rise in the real price is assumed to be 
demand induced and is modeled as the primary determinant of the supply 
of housing.4'i  Although the data in tables 5 and 6 are not conclusive, they 
support the supply view of the rise in the real price. Table 5 shows that 
the real price declined when outlays for real structures were a relatively 
large portion of real GNP and that the recent rise in real price has been 
accompanied by a relative decline in the production of structures. Table 6 
indicates that the movement in the real price is negatively correlated with 
the productivity growth in the construction industry relative to overall 
productivity growth. During the  1950-65  period, construction showed 
above-average productivity growth, and the real price of structures fell; 
since then construction has had below-average productivity growth, and 
the real nrice has risen. 
46.  Lawrence  H.  Summers,  "Inflation  and  the  Valuation  of  Physical  Assets," 
paper presented  at the 93d Annual  Meeting  of  the American  Economic  Association, 
Denver,  September  6,  1980;  and  James  M.  Poterba,  "Inflation,  Income  Taxes,  and 
Owner-Occupied  Housing,"  Working  Paper  553  (National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  September  1980).  Neither  Summers  nor 
Poterba  allow  for supply  substitution  between  single-family  housing  and other  struc- 
tures,  and  Poterba's  estimated  price  response  appears  to  be  dependent  on  an  un- 
believably  large  credit  rationing  effect-$1.5  billion  of  new  single-family  construc- 
tion for  $1 billion  of  additional  deposits. Patric  H.  Hendershott  433 
Table 6.  Determinants of the Rise in the Real Price of Structures, Supply, 
Selected Periods,  1950-77 
Percent 
Annual rate of productivity growth  Chlange  in the ratio of 
structures deflator 
Period  Construction  All industries  to GNP deflator 
1950-65  3.4  2.7  -7.0 
1965-73  -2.1  2.0  10.0 
1973-77  0.3  1.1  10.0 
Sources:  Productivity-Econiontic  Report  of  the Presidenit,  Januzxary  1979,  table  16,  p.  71;  ratio  of  struc- 
tures  to  GNP  deflator-Econzomic  Report  of  the Presidenit, Januiiary 1980,  table  B-3,  pp.  206-07.  The  struc- 
tures  deflator  is measured  as  a  simple  average  of  the deflators  for  residential  and  nonresidential  structures. 
A  second important feedback effect works through interest rates. To 
illustrate, an exogenous increase in the demand for housing will raise in- 
terest rates, choking off some of the increased housing demand and the 
demands for other capital. Allowing  for the feedback of  interest rates 
requires modeling all demands for capital (and saving to the extent that it 
is not independent of interest rates). In fact, either a full macroeconomic 
model must be used or, perhaps more reasonably, the Federal Reserve 
can be assumed to offset the macroeconomic effects of the initial increase 
in demand by raising real interest rates  (and  so  made endogenous).4 
Analysis, including feedbacks, is postponed until a later date. The simu- 
lations reported below should be viewed as partial equilibrium calcula- 
tions and provide upper bounds on the estimated effects operating through 
demand. 
FORECASTS  OF  HOUSING  DEMAND,  1979-80 
The period following the estimation, 1979:1-1980:2,  provides a chal- 
lenging forecast  test.  The  real value  of  total  housing  starts remained 
about the same during the first three quarters of  1979  and then plum- 
meted. The decline was largely in the number of starts, which were at only 
47.  See  Patric  H.  Hendershott,  "Model  Simulations  of  the  Impact  of  Selective 
Credit Policies  and Financial  Reforms:  The  Appropriate  Monetary-Policy  Assump- 
tion," Journal  of  Banking  and Finance,  vol.  1  (September  1977),  pp.  173-84;  and 
Hendershott,  "Analysis  of  the  Impact  of  Capital-Specific  Policies  or  Legislation: 
Application  to Reforms  of  the Tax-Exempt  Market," Journal  of Money,  Credit,  and 
Banking,  special  issue,  Financial  Market  Behavior,  Capital  Formation,  and  Eco- 
nomic  Performance,  vol.  12  (May  1980),  pp.  377-99.  See  also,  Ray  C.  Fair,  "The 
Sensitivity  of  Fiscal  Policy  Effects to Assumptions  about  the Behavior  of  the Federal 
Reserve,"  Econometrica,  vol.  46  (September  1978),  pp.  1165-79. O.,  00  t-  -1 
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half the 1978 average in 1980:2;  the real value per start, in contrast, was 
only down by 5 percent. Also,  the real after-tax mortgage rate, and thus 
the real user cost, rose sharply for the first time in almost half a century, 
and the mortgage-payment constraint increased to an unprecedented level. 
Table 7 contains forecasts of the number of one-to-four family housing 
starts, divided into two parts. The first presents observed values of the 
key explanatory variables for the 1978:4-1980:2  period. The forecast of 
the number of starts depends significantly on projected future changes in 
the number of  adjusted homeowners. The last available calculation of 
adjusted homeownership is for  1979: 1. For the remaining quarters, the 
change was set at the sample mean, that is, 680,000  at an annual rate. 
The second part reports the predicted change in homeownership and the 
difference between the predicted and the actual numbers of housing starts 
under a variety of assumptions about the importance of credit rationing 
in the cycle. These assumptions are that the impact of the rationing vari- 
ables in the cycle was (1)  the same as in earlier cycles, (2)  half as great, 
or (3)  nonexistent.48  These are equivalent, respectively, to the assump- 
tions that the mortgage market was (1)  no more integrated with capital 
markets generally than in the early and middle  1970s  (full  rationing), 
(2)  half integrated (half  rationing),  or  (3)  fully  integrated  (zero  ra- 
tioning). 
Housing  starts fell  from  1,624,000  at an annual rate in  1978:4  to 
752,000  in 1980:2  with 615,000,  or 70 percent, of the decline occurring 
after 1979:3.  The full-rationing model underpredicts starts in every quar- 
ter except 1979: 1; the cumulated error for the six quarters (divided by 
four) is 139,000.  The sharp drop in starts in 1979: 1 has been attributed 
by Jaffee and Rosen  to a particularly severe winter,49 and an equation 
48.  These  assumptions  are  implemented  by  adjusting  the  equation  for  housing 
starts. The estimated  equation  in table  3 is of  the form 
ST  =  aeAA +  f3eJRAA  +  ..., 
where  the  superscript  denotes  estimated  coefficients.  This  equation  is  equivalent  to 
ST  =  aAA  +  fle329 +  y(JRAA -  329)  +  ..., 
where a =  ae and y =  pe (329  is the  1979:1  value  of JRAA).  This  is the full-ration- 
ing  (zero-integration)  equation.  The  half-rationing  equation  is  obtained  by  setting 
a =  ae/2  and -y  =  /e/2.  The equation  for zero rationing  has a =  -y =  0. 
49.  Jaffee and  Rosen,  "Mortgage  Credit  Availability,"  p.  362.  Jaffee  and  Rosen 
state that the  impact  of  the  unusually  harsh  weather  was  perceived  by  housing  ex- 
perts to have reduced  single-family  starts by about  300,000.  They  further  argue  that 
these starts would  not be made  up in the following  quarter. 0%  4  C  14C  r'4  0o 
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should not be expected to capture the impact of such an event. Thus the 
full-rationing model consistently and significantly underpredicts starts. 
The equation for half rationing appears to forecast best; the positive 
and negative errors about cancel, leaving a cumulative error of only 6,000. 
However, the expected overprediction in 1979: 1 has already been noted, 
and I argue below that the equation would also be expected to overpredict 
in 1980: 1 and 1980:2.  Thus in the only quarters that I would expect the 
equation to forecast accurately, 1979:2-1979:4,  the equation underpre- 
dicts. This suggests that even half rationing may be too large an impact. 
The equation for zero rationing contains the same pattern of errors, but 
the underpredictions in the 1979:2-1979:4  period are much smaller and 
the overpredictions in 1980:1  and 1980:2  much larger. Even though this 
equation leads to a cumulative overprediction of  128,000,  I think it best 
captures the impact of  the phenomena it was designed to capture. The 
severe weather in 1979: 1 explains the overprediction, and the unprece- 
dented strong expectations in 1980: 1 and 1980:2 that interest rates would 
decline shortly can explain these errors (see  below).  Although the evi- 
dence is somewhat cloudy, it seems consistent with the view that rationing 
was not a factor in the most recent housing recession.50 
Table 8 contains three parts: forecasts of the real value per start, total 
real value of starts (the product of the number and real value per start), 
and real one-to-four family housing stock. These forecasts are dynamic 
in the sense that the predicted lagged quality of the average housing start 
is used in the calculations after 1979: 1. The predicted real value of starts 
uses the predictions of starts that assume zero rationing. 
The average quality per start rose by $400  (1972  prices)  in 1979:2 
from the preceding quarter and then declined by a total of $1,300 through 
1980:2.  The forecast misses the rise in  1979:2  and then overstates the 
decline in 1980 by 1,600-that  is, the estimated equation implies that the 
sharp increases between  1979:3  and  1980:2  in the mortgage-payment 
constraint (0.040)  and the user cost  (0.034)  should have lowered the 
average quality by even more than they did. 
50.  Much  of  the cloudiness  is because  of  the uncertainty  regarding  the change  in 
the number of adjusted homeowners.  If the actual  change  were at the low  end of  the 
1975-78  experience,  520,000  at  an  annual  (1978)  rate,  even  the  equation  for  zero 
rationing  would  underpredict  cumulative  starts by 59,000.  On the other  hand,  if the 
actual  change  in  adjusted  homeownership  were  at  the  high  end  of  recent  experi- 
ence-840,000-then  the  equation  for  zero  rationing  would  overpredict  starts  by 
63,000,  but the equation  for  half  rationing  would  underpredict. 438  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1980 
An explanation for both the underprediction of the quality of starts and 
the overprediction of  the number of  starts that occurs once  the avail- 
ability variable is fully suppressed in the equations is that the extraor- 
dinarily high mortgage rate in late 1979 and early 1980 was not expected 
to remain at that level  for long. The mortgage rate rose sharply from 
11.25  percent in  1979:3  to  15.21  in  1980:2  (and  peaked at  16.56  in 
April 1980). -l  At the same time, the yield curve for U.S. Treasury se- 
curities became  inverted to  an  unprecedented extent.  While  the  U.S. 
short-term (one-year)  rate normally rises above the long-term rate in the 
late stages of the business cycle, the spread has historically been only 50 
to  100 basis points  (late  1966  and about midyear in  1969,  1973,  and 
1974).  In contrast, in late  1979 the spread exceeded  200  basis points, 
and in early 1980 it was over 300 points. This suggests that investors and 
borrowers were expecting significant declines in interest rates. (The mort- 
gage rate rose as high as it did because both borrowers and lenders viewed 
it as a relatively short-term rate.)  This might be expected to have had 
two effects. First, some potential buyers probably delayed their purchase 
or order of new construction, a fact that can explain starts being lower 
in 1980 than in the forecast. Second, home buyers who went ahead with 
their purchase or order should not have lowered the quality of their pur- 
chase in line with the high mortgage rates. They expected to be able to 
refinance at lower rates in the near future, and it is the average mortgage 
rate expected to be paid over the lifetime of the investment that belongs 
in the user-cost calculation. To account for the latter expectation, I arbi- 
trarily dampened the increase in the mortgage rate in late 1979  and the 
first half of  1980.  The substitution of the real user-cost and mortgage- 
payment constraint variables based on a smaller rise in the mortgage rate, 
11.32 to 13.25, for those listed in table 7 raises the quality of the average 
start by $300 in 1979:4,  $600 in 1980: 1, and $900 in 1980:2.  Nonethe- 
less, the equation still underpredicts the quality of the average start in 
1980:2  by  more than $1,000.52 Forecasts  based  on  an equation with 
51.  Effective  rate  on  conventional  home  mortgage  loans  with  twenty-five  year 
maturity,  national  average  for all major types  of  lenders,  at 75 percent  loan-to-price 
ratio.  See  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  Journlal,  vol.  13  (September  1980), 
table S.5.2, p. 51. 
52.  Another  possible  explanation  for the underprediction  is that the time  needed 
for  adjustment  to  the  unprecedented  increases  in the  price  variables  may  be  longer 
than the  implied  speed of  adjustment  in the estimated  equation. Patric H. Hendershott  439 
greater price elasticities, such as equations 4-3  and 4-4,  would generate 
even larger errors. Thus 4-2 is used in the policy simulations below. 
Even with the above dampening of the price variables, the equation 
for average quality predicts an average start that is $2,500 lower in quality 
in  1980:2  than it was a year earlier. However, a structural change has 
recently occurred that should dampen such a decline in quality. In Novem- 
ber  1976  the FHA  began insuring graduated-payment mortgages with 
five alternative plans. Although the plans all had graduated payments, 
none has significantly reduced financial constraints on home buyers. The 
initial loan on the most popular of these plans was 90.4  percent of the 
original purchase price, and the highest eventual outstanding loan balance 
after five years was 97 percent of the initial house value. The alternative 
was a 96 percent initial loan on a fixed-payment mortgage. In effect, the 
lower  early  mortgage payments  on  the  graduated-payment mortgages 
came at the expense of a higher percentage down payment, nearly 10 per- 
cent instead of the 4 percent customarily put down on small FHA mort- 
gages. Households could have created this graduated-payment mortgage 
on their own by putting 4 percent down, investing the other 6 percent in 
liquid assets, and using the liquid assets and income from them to pay part 
of the monthly payments during the first five years. But a new program 
introduced July 1, 1980, promises to reduce the financial constraints. Un- 
der this plan a down payment of only the customary 4 percent is required 
and monthly payments rise at an annual rate of 4.9 percent for the first 
ten years. In the eighth year the outstanding loan peaks at 110 percent 
of the initial house price. Under this plan the payments in the initial year 
on a thirty-year mortgage are a full 25 percent below those on an other- 
wise similar level-payment mortgage. That is, the fraction of disposable 
income  absorbed by  net  tax  mortgage payments  would  decline  from 
0.1975  (based on a 12?/2  percent mortgage) to 0.148 1. According to my 
best estimates, if all credit-constrained borrowers were able to obtain such 
mortgages, the  average quality per start would  rise by  $1,500  (1972 
prices). 
The last two parts of table 8 translate the forecasted starts and quality 
per start into the real value of starts and the real housing stock. These 
forecasts are based  on  the  zero-rationing, full-integration forecasts  of 
starts. The errors in the real-value forecasts largely reflect errors in the 
number of starts, although the errors in quality per start in 1980 act as a 440  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
partial offset. Given that the errors in starts and quality per start in 1980 
are offset, the only large error in real value is in 1979: 1. The real value 
of the stock of housing is tracked closely; the error is always less than 
$1 billion. 
Policy Simulations 
The two policy simulations reported are attempts to determine the long- 
term (1964-79)  impact of the increase in inflation on the real stock of 
one-to-four  family housing and the roles of  the various financial vari- 
ables in the housing cycles since 1965. 
INFLATION  AND  THE  FAVORED  TAX  TREATMENT 
OF  SINGLE-FAMILY  HOUSING 
The real user cost of capital for owner-occupied housing of households 
in the 15 percent tax bracket declined from just under 8 percent in the 
early 1960s to 4 percent in 1978. This drop follows directly from a sharp 
fall in real after-tax interest rates. Rates do not appear to have increased 
by even as much as expected inflation, much less by the multiple increase 
needed to maintain real after-tax rates. In contrast, the real user cost for 
rental housing and thus the equilibrium rental cost fell by only about 1.5 
percentage points during the same period. The use of historical cost de- 
preciation in an inifationary period and the passage of legislation that in- 
creased taxation of investments in rental housing have acted to offset, in 
large measure, the decline in real after-tax financing rates. As  a result, 
homeownership has been encouraged. 
The impact of rising inflation on the quality of housing demanded is 
less clear. The decline in the real user cost has, of course, encouraged 
investment in relatively larger houses, but the sharp rise in the ratio of 
initial mortgage payments to income has restricted the quantity of feasible 
investment. Thus the quality of starts (and the growth rate of the housing 
stock) could have been higher or lower. 
To calculate the impact of rising inflation in the given tax environment 
on the stock of single-family housing, a simulation was run for the 1964: 
2-1979:4  period  in  which  the  ratio  of  the  real user cost  for  owner- 
occupied housing to that for rental housing was maintained at 0.7847;  the Patric H. Hendershott  441 
real after-tax mortgage rate incorporated in the user cost for homeowners 
in the 30 percent tax bracket was held at 0.0308;  and the nominal, after- 
tax mortgage rate built into the mortgage payment variable was main- 
tained at 0.0408.  All these were observed 1964: 1 values. In addition, the 
equation for  housing starts was modified so  that it would fully reflect 
policy-induced changes in homeownership.53 
The simulation results imply that inflation has raised the real single- 
family housing stock by about 15 percent, or from $744 billion to $856 
billion  (1972  prices).  The  observed  increase  in  the  1964:2-1979:4 
period, $261 billion, was 75 percent more than it would have been in the 
absence of the favorable taxation of owner-occupied housing. The quality 
of  the average start was increased by  $1,000  (1972  prices)  by  1968 
(an  increase  of  about  5  percent),  remained  $500  to  $1,500  greater 
through 1976,  and was more than $2,000  (or  10 percent)  greater from 
late 1977 through the first half of 1979. The cumulation of this differen- 
tial in quality during the 1964:2-1979:4  period accounts for $33 billion 
of the $111 billion total increase attributable to rising inflation. Most of 
the increment was due to the 4.5 million increase in the number of home- 
owners and thus single-family housing starts. 
DETERMINANTS  OF  RECENT  SINGLE-FAMILY 
HOUSING  CYCLES 
The simulation experiments summarized  in table 9 are designed to iden- 
tify the roles in all housing cycles since 1965 of the key variables of real 
53. Recall that the starts equation is of the form 
ST =  a1ACHOA  +  a2 ACHO +  a3 LRUC +..., 
where the first term is the projected average four-quarter  change in adjusted  home- 
ownership;  the second term is the observed current average four-quarter  change in 
homeownership;  and the last term reflects a response to  the long-run change in 
homeownership based on differences between the weighted average past ratio of 
user costs and the current ratio. The estimated equation has the property that the 
mean of the sum of the three terms is about equal to the mean change in home- 
ownership. However, in this policy  simulation the  reduction in  homeownership 
caused by prevention  of a decline in the user-cost ratio will not reduce starts one- 
for-one because a2 is far below unity. The equation was modified to 
ST  =  ai  ACHOA  +  a2  ACHO  +  a3  LRUC  +  1.0(ACHO  -  ACHO)  +..., 
where ACHO and LRUC are the control-calculated  values of ACHO and LRUC. 
(ACHOA  is exogeneous.)  Thus  policy-induced  changes  in ACHO,  that  is ACHO  - 
ACHO,  will affect starts  one-for-one. 442  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1980 
Table 9.  Determinants of Single-Family Housing Production Cycles, Selected Periods, 
1965:2-1980:2 
Billions  of  1972 dollars 
Amoun1t  due to chalnge  in variable 
Real value  Chanige  from  Mortgage- 
of housing  previouis  payment  Credit 
Perioda  starts  periodb  User cost  conistrainit  availcability 
Housing  recessions 
1966:3-1967:2  17.3  -4.8  2.3  -0.  1  -1.9 
1969:4-1970:3  17.5  -4.9  0.3  -0.4  -2.4 
1974:3-1975:2  19.1  -12.8  3.8  -0.5  -6.3 
1980:1-1980:2  19.2  -17.9  -12.2  -0.9  -  1.2c 
Housing  booms 
1965:2-1966:1  22.1  ...  ...  ... 
1968:1-1968:4  22.4  5.1  0.5  -0.2  2.4 
1972:3-1973:2  31.9  14.4  1.6  -0.3  5.9 
1977:3-1978:2  37.1  18.0  5.4  -1.0  7.2 
Source:  Simulations  by  the  author.  For  the  real  value  of  starts  see  sources  of  table  4. 
a.  Housing  booms  and  recessions  are  defined  as  the  highest  and  lowest  four  quarters  of  the  real  value 
of  single-family  housing  starts,  with  the  exception  of  the  1980:1-1980:2  recession. 
b.  For  recessions,  change  from  previous  housing  boomi;  for  booms,  change  fromii previous  recession. 
c.  Based  on  no  restrictive  availability  effect  in  1980.  If  a  full  impact  of  the  availability  variable  were 
allowed,  this  figure  would  be  -8.4. 
user  cost,  mortgage-payment constraint,  and  credit  availability. Four 
simulations were run for the 1965:2-1980:2  period. The first was a con- 
trol run. The three policy  runs maintained  (1)  the  mortgage-payment 
constraint equal to its  1964:1  value of  0.08531,  (2)  the user cost for 
taxpayers in the 30 percent bracket equal to 0.0599  and for those in the 
15 percent bracket equal to 0.7848  multiplied by the rental user cost, 
both  of  these  being  1965: 1  values,  and  (3)  the  constrained  credit- 
availability variable equal to zero and the Jaffee-Rosen variable equal to 
0.1718  for 1964:2-1971:1  and 0.271 for 1971:2-1980:2.  The contribu- 
tion of, say, the real user cost to a particular housing recession is calcu- 
lated as the impact of the user cost in the recession (control minus policy) 
minus the impact in the previous boom (control minus policy).  The table 
shows the actual real value of starts during each period, the actual change 
from the previous boom or recession, and the measured impacts of the 
financial variables. The sum of the measured impacts differs from the ac- 
tual change because of changes in other variables (real income, number 
of households, and portion of starts that are subsidized),  interactive ef- 
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The following points summarize the impacts that the three variables 
had on housing. First, the almost continual decline until 1979-80  in the 
real user costs  generated a continual shift toward homeownership and 
houses of higher quality. Thus single-family housing production tended to 
be greater in each period until 1979-80,  regardless of whether it was a 
housing boom  or a recession. Second,  the almost continual rise in the 
home mortgage rate and real price of houses has exerted a continuously 
increasing constraint on a shift to houses of higher quality. Hence housing 
production tends to be lower in each period, whether it is a housing boom 
or a recession.  Third, credit availability has  an asymmetric impact on 
booms and recessions. Abundant credit availability has always stimulated 
starts during booms, and a lack of availability has restricted starts in all 
housing recessions  until  1979-80.  Even  when starts are not  being re- 
stricted, as is  assumed to have been the case in  1979-80,  credit avail- 
ability has a negative impact relative to the earlier stimulation. 
Two facets of the impact of the user-cost variables stand out. Because 
the user costs  declined  more rapidly since  1972  than before  then, the 
impacts, $3.8  and $5.4  billion,  in the two periods following  (1974:3- 
1975:2  and 1977:3-1978:2)  are substantially larger than those in the 
early periods. Much of the boom in single-family housing in the middle 
and late 1970s was attributable to the user-cost variable. At least equally 
important is the negative impact of the user cost in the most recent hous- 
ing recession. Possibly because of a more resilient financial system-the 
forecasts suggest that the mortgage market had become fully integrated 
with capital markets generally-the  monetary authorities were able, or 
were  compelled,  to  raise  interest  rates  by  unprecedented  magnitudes 
and speed. Moreover, mortgage rates moved faster and more than bond 
rates.  (Never  again are stories about the  sluggishness or  stickiness of 
mortgage rates likely to be heard.)  As  a result, real after-tax mortgage 
rates, and thus the user cost of housing capital, rose sharply for the first 
time in memory. 
Conclusions 
The increase in inflation during the  1964-79  period, in conjunction 
with the U.S.  tax system, has had a marked impact on the demand for 
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rent of owner-occupied housing relative to that of rental housing led about 
4.5  million additional households to own rather than rent. The decline 
over the same period in the rental price of owner-occupied houses relative 
to prices of  other consumer goods  led to  the demand for significantly 
larger houses. Despite a doubling of the real initial mortgage payment on 
a constant-quality house, the quality of houses built in the period from late 
1977 to early 1979 was 10 percent higher than it would have been in the 
absence of the inflation-induced decline in the real rental price of owner- 
occupied housing  (and rise in mortgage rates).  The real housing stock 
was $33  billion  (1972  prices)  greater in  1979  because  of  this quality 
effect.  54 At 1979 house prices, the impact is twice as large. 
Between  1965  and 1976 the dominant determinant of housing cycles 
was the availability of funds at traditional mortgage-financing  institutions 
and the activity of federally sponsored credit agencies. Changes in the real 
rental price of housing were not a cyclical factor because this price had not 
moved  cyclically.  The  1979-80  housing recession  constituted a  sharp 
break in this pattern. The unprecedented swiftness and magnitude of the 
rise in mortgage rates caused the first significant  rise in real after-tax mort- 
gage rates in decades. As a result, the real rental price of owner-occupied 
housing rose sharply, leading builders to forecast a future decline in the 
demand for owner-occupied units. Moreover, the expectation (reflected in 
the severe inversion of  the yield curve)  that mortgage rates were only 
temporarily high led to a delay in orders by households for new units. 
These two responses alone can explain the sharp fall in starts. That is, 
forecasts of the 1979:1-1980:2  period are more plausible when declines 
in the traditional measures of credit availability are given no weight. Thus 
it appears that the expansion of secondary mortgage-market instruments 
and activity in the second half of the 1970s have largely, if not fully, inte- 
grated the mortgage market with capital markets generally. As a conse- 
quence, credit availability is unlikely to be a major factor in housing cy- 
cles in the future. 
54.  Barry P. Bosworth has suggested that the decline in the real rental price of 
owner-occupied  units may have increased  household formation itself by one million. 
At an average housing unit price of $20,000 (1972 prices), this would give an addi- 
tional $20 billion of housing. Adding this to the $33 billion and converting to 1979 
house prices would raise the total impact on the housing stock to over $100 billion 
in 1979 prices. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Barry P. Bosworth:  This is a useful empirical paper because it provides a 
synthesis of several determinants of housing demand that previously have 
been examined by Patric Hendershott and others on a more individual 
basis. These include a sophisticated treatment of demographic variables; 
inclusion of a role for credit rationing; a user cost of capital as a means of 
evaluating the impact of  tax policy,  interest rates, and inflation; and a 
mortgage-payment constraint. These factors are examined within a three- 
equation  recursive model.  The  model  begins  by  predicting  the  pro- 
portion of  households  that is  homeowners; then,  from the number of 
homeowners predicts the number of one-to-four family units built; and, 
finally, explains the average value per unit started. I found the first several 
sections on tenure choice very informative; but I have some concerns with 
parts of the paper relating to housing starts. 
Hendershott takes the total number of households to be predetermined. 
Yet  the Census Bureau's definition of  a household  is those individuals 
who occupy a housing unit. It counts the occupied portion of a version of 
the housing stock, which differs from the conventional stock by the inclu- 
sion of  mobile homes and the exclusion of  vacation homes. The num- 
ber of  households  is,  therefore, more nearly a measure of  the existing 
housing stock than a demographically determined characteristic of  the 
population;  and  households  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  predetermined 
in a model that seeks to explain the change in the number of housing units. 
In fact, an inspection of the annual survey shows a pronounced slowing 
of household formation in each of the postwar housing crunches. In these 
periods, marriages are postponed, children delay leaving home, and indi- 
viduals double up to share dwellings. As a result, the use of households 
in the denominator of the homeownership ratio implies at least some prob- 
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lems of common endogenous changes in housing starts and households 
that is only partially eliminated by the lag structure. 
I was somewhat confused by the portion of the paper that discusses 
housing demand-that  is, I do not understand the assumption that the 
demand for homeownership is equivalent to the demand for one-to-four 
family units. This relation is introduced in the section on the number of 
units started, where the stock of these family units is defined as home- 
owners minus owners of  "condominiums" plus rentals of  these family 
units and vacancies. Hendershott suppresses this problem of  mapping 
tenure choice into type of unit, however, by assuming that the fractions 
accounted for by condominiums on the one hand and renters on the other 
are relatively constant. In fact, he does admit to some year-to-year varia- 
tions in these ratios. In addition, the ratios do have a trend. 
This issue of tenure (homeownership or rental) versus structure type 
(one-to-four  family  or  multifamily)  is  also  revelant to  another issue. 
Hendershott states that the tax laws in combination with inflation have 
acted to increase homeownership. With this I agree. A  related issue is 
whether the combination of inflation and the tax laws have increased in- 
vestment of the nation's resources in housing. One way this might show 
up in the data is that people would desire a bigger house. Yet Hendershott 
correctly emphasizes that increased mortgage payments have acted as a 
powerful offset. Many people were induced to become homeowners rather 
than renters but that will affect total housing only if rental units imply 
smaller units. Although this is true, the actual difference in unit values 
of  single-family and multifamily units reflects many factors besides the 
ratio of user cost of homeownership versus rental. In addition, if the cur- 
rent number of households and the demographic projections prepared in 
1970-71  are compared, it is clear that inflation and taxes have not gener- 
ated a major increase in the number of households. 
The share of national output devoted to housing has declined during 
the 1970s despite an acceleration of the demographic determinants. Fur- 
thermore, despite the fact that the United States has the fastest population 
growth of the major OECD countries, it is among the lowest in the share 
of output in residential construction. This is not consistent with the view 
that the interaction between inflation and the tax laws has led the United 
States to  overinvest in housing  at the expense  of  business investment. 
Homeownership has risen because of the tax-inflation interaction but the 
effect of that interaction on total home building has been much smaller. Patric H. Hendershott  447 
I think some of this inconsistency can be resolved, however, by inclu- 
sion of the value of land and by placing a greater emphasis on supply 
factors. Land as well as quality of the structure is a major dimension in 
which we  should expect  the asset demand for housing to be reflected. 
Changing local zoning restrictions have in the 1970s created a much more 
rigid supply of housing than in earlier decades. Thus much of the asset 
demand for housing has been reflected in a bidding up of  land prices 
rather than in diverting other resources from competing uses. I do not be- 
lieve that the user-cost concept for evaluating the effects of inflation and 
taxes  can be  used within a model  that ignores the land component of 
housing, because land prices have not risen at the same rate as the price 
of structures. For example, home prices, excluding land, rose 60 percent 
more than the general price level between 1972 and 1979; including land, 
those prices rose twice as much as other prices. 
Dwight  M.  Jaffee: It is  with  a  sense  of  dej"a  vu  that I discuss  Patric 
Hendershott's paper. Kenneth Rosen  and I presented our paper on the 
subject at these meetings just one year ago before the dramatic decline in 
housing that Hendershott reports.  We concluded that paper with the warn- 
ing that "under the pressure of high short-term interest rates . . . a more 
traditional, sharper cyclical decline in housing starts may develop during 
late 1979 and early 1980."' Well, that has come true with a vengeance, 
particularly  during the spring of 1980, which brought fully disrupted capi- 
tal markets and a record-breaking  decline in housing starts. 
There is  no  denying the  author's primary general  conclusion,  that 
monetary policy caused the housing recession, overriding in the process 
a strong underlying demand for housing and a number of developments 
in mortgage and deposit markets favorable for housing finance. At this 
level, however, what is missing in the paper is the dramatic tale of the 
remarkable 1980  episode  for U.S.  monetary policy  and its impact on 
housing. Specifically, Hendershott emphasizes that the  1980  tailspin of 
housing starts occurred in the absence of a credit crunch. In my view, the 
1980  credit crunch will  rank among the best-such  as the  crunch of 
1966-albeit  it is something of a new breed, as Albert Wojnilower char- 
acterizes it very well in his paper in this issue. 
Hendershott's position on the credit crunch leads him to ignore any 
1. Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Mortgage  Credit Availability and 
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detailed exploration of the mechanism by which monetary policy affected 
housing during 1980. Table 4 of the paper, for example, makes his point 
very clearly: the 1980 housing downturn was uniquely affected by high 
interest rates (operating through the user-cost variable), with an unusu- 
ally modest role for mortgage-payment and availability effects (the latter 
measured by thrift institution deposit flows and related variables). I have 
no problem with this description. But it misses the extreme turbulence in 
capital markets that leads traditional mortgage lenders to cease making 
funds available, not because they lacked funds in hand (the traditional 
availability link),  but because they dared not allow those funds out of 
hand. So again I return to Wojnilower's point in his paper: that 1980 
may be a new breed of credit crunch, but it is a credit crunch nonetheless, 
because that is the mechanism through which monetary policy operates 
effectively in the end. 
In Hendershott's model and econometric results, he first explains the 
tenure choice  decision, that is, whether to become  a homeowner; then 
uses homeownership, a long-run user-cost effect, and a credit-availability 
variable to determine housing starts; and finally, generates housing quality 
as a function of income, the user cost of capital, and a mortgage-payment 
variable. The tenure choice material, following and confirming the work 
of Harvey and Kenneth Rosen-both  singly and jointly-is  very useful. 
Hendershott, wisely I think, uses the adjusted homeownership technique 
of Jaffee and Kenneth Rosen to clear away those changes in the home- 
ownership rate that arise from shifts in the age distribution and in the 
propensity of the population to form households. His results then show 
clearly that a carefully measured user-cost variable is the key determinant 
of the tenure choice  decision. He  does not find a significant impact of 
credit availability on homeownership, whereas Rosen and I did, but that 
may be a matter of how hard one looks. 
A  more serious concern, in my view, which relates to all the recent 
work on tenure choice, is that the homeownership rate has had a steady 
uptrend over Hendershott's sample, while the user-cost variable has had 
an equally steady downtrend, raising the possibility of spurious correla- 
tion. Looking  at the graph of  the user-cost variable in figure 1 of  the 
paper, I am worried further because the two key exceptions to this down- 
trend-before  1960  and between  1979  and  1980-are  not part of the 
estimation sample. Finally, the accuracy of the quarterly movements of 
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The equation for housing starts is surprisingly simple:  the long-run 
effect of user cost and the change in adjusted homeownership both repre- 
senting demand, and the availability measure representing  the finance con- 
straint. Even if the short-run changes in homeownership were measured 
accurately, I think there would be some case for additional demand-side 
variables. Given the imperfections in the data on homeownership, addi- 
tional variables are needed all the more. A measure of removed units to 
account for replacement demand is another component missing from the 
specification of  housing starts. Hendershott suggests that the variables 
specified may account for it in part, but replacement demand is quanti- 
tatively too important and too interesting a component of housing pro- 
duction to receive such summary  treatment. 
The estimated equation for housing starts indicates that an increase of 
$1 billion in thrift institution deposit flows  (in  1978  prices)  increases 
starts by 7,000  units at annual rates. The author is highly critical of the 
Jaffee and Rosen estimate that is more than double this. He fails to recog- 
nize, however, that the measure of the availability of thrift institution de- 
posits is a proxy for rationing over the full spectrum of mortgage lending, 
of which thrift institutions represent, as it turns out, just about one-half. 
The  third, and last,  estimated  equation  of  the  model  explains  the 
"average quality" of housing starts. Data are again a problem here, but 
the rich specification, in fact, fits very well. 
Finally, I want to comment on the historical, out-of-sample, simulation 
between 1979:1  and 1980:2.  The tracking is poor, with the actual ex- 
ceeding the predicted by large amounts in  all  quarters. Even  the  one 
observation that is  close,  housing  starts in  1979:1,  is  wrong because 
severe winter conditions reduced the actual housing starts by an estimated 
300,000  units (according to Jaffee and Rosen).  Unfortunately, adjusting 
the actual number in 1979: 1 by 300,000  units puts this error right in line 
with the rest. 
The  poor tracking is  a  serious problem. Hendershott  suggests two 
"fixes"  for the model in this period, but I view these as unacceptable. The 
first is to set the availability measure equal to zero for this period, which 
has the effect of at least distributing the errors positively and negatively. 
Although  availability effects  may  have  been  reduced,  I  see  no  prior 
grounds for completely overriding the availability variable in this way. 
The second is based on the unusual sharply descending yield curve that 
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changed response to the high interest rate level. I have no basic problem 
with the concept; but in the basic equation, the sign goes in the wrong 
direction for explaining the number of starts. A descending yield curve, 
indicating expectations of declining interest rates, is a reason to postpone 
demand. But only if we accept the suppression of the credit-availability 
variable, thus producing overpredictions in 1980, does this second argu- 
ment take on the correct sign. 
I am afraid that we cannot ignore the obvious, namely that the respon- 
siveness of homeownership to the interest rate has been exaggerated in 
the estimated equation, thus confirming my fears concerning the spurious 
correlation between homeownership and the user-cost variable. 
I  conclude  with  one  general  observation  on  the  relation  between 
monetary policy and housing. Even if Hendershott goes too far in elimi- 
nating availability effects, one should believe that the recent changes in 
deposit and mortgage markets may well  have significantly reduced the 
traditional, disintermediation-based, availability link. In discussions lead- 
ing to these changes over many years, it was noted that monetary policy 
would have to be tighter to achieve a given effect on aggregate demand if 
housing were more protected from this mortgage-availability link. The 
events of the past nine months appear to confirm this strongly. I think this 
is an improvement from the standpoint of allocational efficiency, but it 
raises serious questions about stabilization policy.  This, of course, is a 
key point of Wojnilower's paper. 
General Discussion 
A  number of  discussants questioned some  aspects of  Hendershott's 
simulations for predicting the effect of changes in inflation, or user costs, 
on the stock of owned houses. Jeffrey Sachs felt that the simulations were 
defective because they failed to model the supply side of the housing in- 
dustry. He  pointed out that an explicit supply schedule  is required to 
predict the division of demand increases between price and quantity re- 
sponses. William Nordhaus noted that, because Hendershott assumed an 
infinitely elastic supply schedule, his simulations provided upper bounds 
on the resource reallocation effects of, for example, inflation. Nordhaus 
noted that Hendershott's simulation of the effects of inflation implied that 
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had come from inflation. He suggested an alternative simulation in which 
both inflation rates and interest rates are changed by the same amount 
from their actual historic values. 
Hendershott defended his omission of the supply side on the grounds 
that he was modeling demand for only a fraction of the output of the con- 
struction industry;  increases in the demand for residential structures  could 
presumably be satisfied, without substantially increasing costs, by attract- 
ing resources from nonresidential construction. He added that during the 
period of his simulation, nonresidential demand for structures had been 
particularly weak. William Brainard commented that, because of differ- 
ences in tax treatment, events such as changes in interest rates or inflation 
might have opposite effects on the demand for rental and owner-occupied 
houses. Hendershott's simulations were less likely to overstate the quan- 
tity responses when there were such offsetting shifts in demand. Sachs 
agreed that inflation might discourage investment in rental units because 
of the adverse tax effects of historical cost depreciation allowances. But 
he argued that this further demonstrated the need to use a general equi- 
librium model  in which  the prices of  both  rental and owner-occupied 
houses are endogenous. 
Alan Blinder observed that whether the rental price converges to the 
user cost of capital or vice versa depends on the endogeneity of housing 
prices and possibly interest rates themselves. The importance of  endo- 
geneity, in turn, depends on the time horizon. In the short run, rents might 
be expected to be relatively stable, with adjustment taking place in the 
prices of existing houses. In the long run, however, as the stock of housing 
adjusts, rents would be expected to reach the level implied by the replace- 
ment cost of houses. Blinder also felt that the four-quarter moving aver- 
age that Hendershott had used for computing permanent income was too 
short. 
Benjamin Friedman offered an alternative way of analyzing the inter- 
action between housing construction and prices. He argued that changes 
in interest rates or inflation that stimulated housing demand would first 
raise the price of existing houses, and thereby Tobin's q for housing (the 
ratio of  the prices of  existing houses  to  the  cost  of  constructing new 
houses).  As long as q remained above unity, resources would be reallo- 
cated to housing construction. Increases in the prices of the natural re- 
source inputs used for home building would increase construction costs 
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tangling land prices from house prices and in comparing old  and new 
houses makes it difficult to estimate q. He stressed the importance of dis- 
tinguishing between  the  price  of  housing  structures and  the  price  of 
housing land. If the recent inflation in house values largely reflects in- 
creases in land prices, it would not be expected to stimulate investment 
of resources in housing structures. 
The discussion turned to the out-of-sample forecasts of Hendershott's 
model in which his equations, without adjustment, generally underpre- 
dicted both the number of starts and their quality. Some discussants shared 
Jaffee's uneasiness with suppressing the credit-availability variable to im- 
prove the tracking of  the numbers of  starts and thereby inferring that 
availability had not been a factor in the latest decline. George Perry noted 
that this problem arose because of  lack of  direct evidence on whether 
mortgages were being rationed. He suggested that the large expansion of 
mortgage pools during the past cycle-a  significant institutional change 
that integrated the mortgage market more fully into the general capital 
market-meant  total availability was greater than Hendershott's variable 
based on flows into  thrift institutions showed. He  observed that when 
Hendershott reduced the impact of his availability variable, it was equiva- 
lent to allowing for greater availability from nonthrift sources. With the 
credit-availability variable suppressed, as full integration of the mortgage 
market might require, Hendershott overpredicted starts in the first half of 
1980,  the period when mortgage rates peaked and then declined rather 
than underpredicting them as the equation using the availability variable 
did; these quarters also showed the largest underprediction of quality per 
start. Perry suggested that some underprediction of quality might auto- 
matically accompany an overprediction of starts because of the changing 
composition of  starts when mortgage markets were tight. Brainard ex- 
panded on Hendershott's discussion of  the exceptionally inverted yield 
curve in early 1980. He noted that estimates of the interest elasticities ob- 
tained from a sample period with more normal yield curves would be 
biased during the forecast period if the yield curve or some proxy was not 
included in the  estimation.  One  would  expect  more  postponement  of 
starts and less  decline in their quality than the biased equation would 
predict. Whether this consideration supports Hendershott's model  thus 
depends on  whether one  accepts  some  suppression of  the  availability 
constraint in the forecast period. 